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Abstract 
This paper is a case study based investigation of aspects of the current 
paradigmatic approach to ‘good’ corporate governance with its focus on the 
interlinked roles of internal control and risk management procedures, internal 
audit and external audit, overseen and co-ordinated by a formal structure of board 
committees, in particular the audit committee. The evidence that we adduce from 
the study of four high profile cases of perceived accounting and governance 
failure provides limited assurance that this approach will in fact be cost effective 
or efficient in preventing further such cases of accounting and governance failure. 
In particular, issues as to fee dependence; lack of relevant knowledge and 
expertise; and social and psychological dependence upon executive management 
appear to have significantly and negatively affected the behaviour and judgement 
formation of the governance gatekeepers. This suggests that further consideration 
of relevant economic, institutional and behavioural factors beyond the rational 
choice model of traditional economics and economic decision making should 
underpin future developments in required modes and structures of governance. 
 
Key words  
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Introduction 
From the late 1980s onwards there has developed a paradigmatic approach to 
‘good’ corporate governance for companies in terms of an overall focus on 
appropriate internal control and risk management procedures within the relevant 
entity.  Responsibilities for such procedures lie with  board members (both 
executive and non-executive) supported by a formal structure of board 
committees; audit committee, nomination committee, remuneration committee 
and also by increased emphasis given to the role of audit, both internal and 
external, as a mechanism for ensuring appropriate governance procedures.  The 
development of this paradigm was given significant impetus by the influential 
COSO report, (COSO, 1992) in the US and in the UK the work of the Cadbury 
Committee (see Collier, 1997), leading to the development of the present 
Corporate Governance Code covering various aspects of corporate governance 
(Financial Reporting Council, FRC, 2016). The Code is not statutory and 
adherence to the Code is not mandatory - but the Stock Exchange listing rules 
issued under the aegis of the Financial Conduct Authority require disclosure of 
non-adherence. 
 
Following the collapse of Enron and subsequently WorldCom, and against a 
background of a series of high profile cases of perceived inappropriate accounting 
and corporate irregularity, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in the US in 2002.  
This Act strengthened further the regulatory underpinnings of the governance 
paradigm outlined above, requiring management to report on the effectiveness of 
internal controls and the external auditor to give an opinion as to the suitability of 
that management assertion, requirements for the external auditor to report directly 
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to the audit committee with respect to accounting policies critical to the overall 
picture presented by the financial statements, and further strengthens the position 
of the audit committee in terms of investigatory powers, resourcing, and the 
appointment and removal of the external auditor. 
 
In the UK, post Enron, the government together with the Financial Reporting 
Council set up a number of investigatory committees and commissioned reports 
re the role and duties of non-executive directors (Higgs, 2003) and re the role and 
duties of audit committees (Smith, 2003).  While a revised version of the 
Combined Code, published by the FRC in 2003, did not radically differ from the 
previous version, it did inter alia require that, for larger listed companies, non-
executive directors should comprise at least half the board, and further 
strengthened the role for the audit committee in monitoring the integrity of the 
company’s financial reporting, reinforcing the independence of the external 
auditor and reviewing the management of financial and other risks. 
 
However, although this paradigm commands widespread support from companies, 
the investing community, regulators and other stakeholders, it has not gone 
entirely unchallenged.  These challenges have come from those who consider that 
such a framework is both costly and likely to stifle enterprise and risk taking, 
from those who question the ability of non-executive directors to satisfactorily 
perform the variety of roles expected from them, and from those who argue that 
the ‘approved’ governance mechanisms put in place have been demonstrably 
ineffective in checking corporate irregularity to date and are unlikely to be any 
more effective in the future (Clarke et al, 2003).  The purpose of this study is to 
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focus primarily on this latter line of argument and to seek, by means of a case 
study approach, to throw further light on those factors which have acted to limit 
its effectiveness and to consider whether they are likely to continue to do so in the 
future. 
 
Issues as to Methodology and Data 
This paper does not seek to adopt or articulate any particular epistemological or 
theoretical perspective to explain or underpin its findings.  In terms of 
methodology it might perhaps be categorised as interpretative, archival based case 
study research.  The advantages and disadvantages of such a research approach 
have been extensively rehearsed and it is not the purpose of this paper to review 
them in any detail.  The paper essentially comprises a review of four high profile 
cases of perceived accounting and governance failure.  Through this review, the 
paper seeks to add to knowledge as to the strengths and limitations of the 
paradigm of ‘good’ corporate governance currently advocated in North America, 
Europe and, through the offices of the OECD, IFAC and others, worldwide.  The 
cases, relate to companies registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) although all the companies are, or were, multinational.  Given 
the limited number of cases, seeking to derive inferences therefrom may be open 
to criticism on a number of grounds - in particular in respect to a lack of 
representativeness.  There are approximately 10,000 publicly listed companies 
subject to SEC regulations in the United States and Francis (2004) suggests that 
the fact that SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases through the ten 
year period (1994 – 2003) averaged only 149 per year is indicative of a relatively 
low overall rate of corporate governance failure.  However, Coffee (2005), 
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drawing on reports from the US General Accounting Office and others, suggests a 
much more widespread malaise with a rapidly increasing trend in earnings 
restatements which rose eight fold between 1995 and 2004 to reach 414 in that 
year, with revenue recognition issues being the single factor responsible for most 
such restatements. 
 
Within the cases looked at there is significant variety in terms of the nature of the 
entity under examination.  These differences relate in part to size although all are, 
or were, very large corporations, to the nature of their business, and to their 
pattern of ownership structure and perceived management style.  There are also 
differences in the nature of the irregularities which took place, in that in four 
instances the primary impropriety related to accounting manipulation, whereas in 
the other two the main concerns related to inappropriate abstraction of corporate 
assets on a heroic scale by senior management - rather than on accounting issues 
per se.  Further questions arise as to the extent to which the companies under 
examination had fully embraced and implemented the internal control and 
governance paradigm outlined above – although all complied with the minimum 
SEC requirements as to the presence of an audit committee and of course the need 
to undergo periodic external audit. 
 
In terms of collection of the underlying information the main sources are ex post 
investigation, whether in terms of reports of bankruptcy examiners (WorldCom) 
or SEC action against the company, its officers, and on occasion its auditors.  In 
one of the four cases (Hollinger) there are also the reports of inquiries internal to 
the company.  In the majority of cases the information available is voluminous.  
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Furthermore the nature of the resources available to these enquiries, and their 
(varied) powers with respect to investigation and compulsion of testimony, mean 
that an enormous wealth of detail is provided.  However compelling this might be, 
there are still issues as to the potential for bias in the manner and approach of 
certain of the inquiries - and normally settlements reached with the SEC do not 
necessarily imply full acceptance of the accuracy of the complaint made.  In 
addition, the inquiries do not all have a common purpose: those of the bankruptcy 
examiners being focused more on claims over remaining assets, whereas those of 
the SEC relate more to a desire to prevent corporate irregularity and to ensure the 
provision of appropriate financial information to the capital markets.  Although all 
of the inquiries identify failings in individual aspects of corporate governance, 
none of them was the purpose to investigate the wider issue of whether the overall 
corporate governance framework is appropriate. 
 
The next, and most substantial section of the paper, sets out the nature of the 
issues of interest in the four cases chosen and seeks to identify those aspects of 
the nature and practice of corporate governance which are relevant to this paper. 
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The Cases 
WorldCom 
On June 9 2003, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of New York issued an interim report 
(Thornburgh, 2003) which expanded on the court's earlier findings (Thornburgh, 
2002) of lack of corporate governance, mismanagement, and concern regarding 
the integrity of WorldCom’s accounting and financial reporting functions. 
Amongst the numerous incidents of mismanagement, corporate governance 
failure, and accounting irregularities, the most salient related to the overstatement 
of reported profitability by inappropriately capitalizing very significant elements 
of operating costs.  In June 2002 and August 2002 WorldCom restated its 
previously filed financial figures by $3.8 and $3.3 billion respectively primarily in 
relation to this failure to charge operating costs to the profit and loss account 
appropriately.  The trigger for these restatements in part was an internal audit 
investigation into the capitalization of operating costs – although this only took 
place after the departure of WorldCom’s dominant chief executive and the 
replacement of Andersen as the external auditor by KPMG.  Indeed an internal 
audit of capital expenditure a year previously had become aware of the existence 
of $2.3 billion of ‘corporate accruals’ in relation to capital expenditure but had 
made no attempt to verify the nature and propriety of these ‘accruals’.  
 
Internal audit at WorldCom was an in-house department first set up in a small 
way in 1993 but which had subsequently grown in numbers - although it was 
never heavily resourced relative to internal audit departments in other companies 
of a similar size.  Formally it had a dual reporting responsibility - reporting to 
both the Chief Financial Officer and to the audit committee, although the 
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bankruptcy examiner had no doubt that its functional reporting responsibilities 
were to the Chief Financial Officer and that its existence and role were very much 
at the behest of senior management: ‘The viability of the Internal Audit 
Department was thus largely dependent on the whim of senior Management, and 
especially the CFO and CEO, with little more than deference being given to the 
Audit Committee.’i  This perceived dependence upon executive management for 
resources led to the work programme concentrating almost exclusively on 
operational aspects focusing on audits and projects that would be seen as adding 
‘value’ to the company seeking to identify ways to maximise revenues, reduce 
costs and improve efficiencies.  It did not involve itself in financial auditing per 
se, and even when it did check accounting entries to subsidiary ledgers it did not 
normally follow these through to the general ledger – apparently to avoid the 
perception of the duplication of work with the external auditors Andersen.  
 
The report of the bankruptcy examiner also provides evidence of lack of uniform 
procedures within the internal audit department relating to the conduct of audits, 
preparation of reports, review of management responses and follow up 
procedures; a lack of co-operation with internal audit by line management; limited 
access by internal auditing staff to the company’s computerised accounting and 
reporting systems; unwarranted influence by management in the preparation and 
negotiation of the internal audit reports; and a lack of a systematic approach in 
relation to highlighting serious internal control weaknesses and tracking of 
management responses and corrective action taken.  
 
Another aspect of the corporate governance paradigm highlighted by the 
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WorldCom case relates to the co-operation and liaison, or rather lack of it, 
between the internal auditors, the external auditors and the audit committee.  
WorldCom had an audit committee constituted in accordance with the 
requirements of the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and, over the relevant period, 
consisting of four non-executive directors with varying degrees of business 
experience and expertise.  The committee met three to five times a year and at 
each meeting would, inter alia, receive an information pack prepared by the 
Director of Internal Audit and on occasion would receive presentations from her.  
Formally, internal audit reported to the audit committee but as the report notes: 
‘while most members of the Audit Committee perceived the Internal Audit 
Department as reporting to the Audit Committee, that was not the case, 
functionally or practically’.ii  Although the audit committee reviewed and 
approved the annual internal audit plan it did not have any input to changes made 
to that plan during the year, for example the diversion to line management activity 
referred to above. The audit committee only received executive summaries of the 
actual audit reports, rarely the full reports.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
members of the audit committee appear to have assumed there to be a much 
greater degree of co-ordination between internal audit and external audit than 
actually took place, and was not aware that Andersen did not receive copies of the 
internal audit reports. 
 
In fact, communication between internal audit and external audit was very 
limited, being largely restricted to joint attendance at the meetings of the audit 
committee.  The external auditors placed little formal reliance upon the work of 
internal audit and, as noted above, internal audit was anxious not to give the 
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impression of duplicating the work of the external auditors.  The lack of 
communication between the two is highlighted in relation to the ability of the 
external auditor to provide annual reassurance to the audit committee on the 
absence of material weaknesses in the company’s systems of internal control, 
notwithstanding the existence of internal audit reports some of which documented 
significant such weaknesses.  It also appears to have been a factor in the failure 
referred to above of internal audit to conduct meaningful financial audit, even 
when aware of circumstances which might have been expected to prompt further 
investigation. 
 
Tyco 
Tyco was a manufacturing and service conglomerate involved in fire and security 
services, electronics, healthcare and specialty product and undersea 
telecommunications networks, its headquarters are in Bermuda.  Here the issues 
of concern lay with the ability of senior management to obtain large and 
undisclosed loans from the company.  The summary of the SEC complaint against 
its senior executives commences: 
 
This is a looting case.  It involves egregious, self-serving and clandestine 
misconduct by the three most senior executives at Tyco International Ltd.  
("Tyco").  From at least 1996 until June of 2002, L.  Dennis Kozlowski 
("Kozlowski") (then Tyco's CEO) and Mark H.  Swartz ("Swartz") (then 
Tyco's CFO) took hundreds of millions of dollars in secret, unauthorized and 
improper low interest or interest-free loans and compensation from Tyco.iii   
 
Apart from this, and as detailed in the separate SEC enforcement release
iv
 in 
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respect to the actions of Richard Scalzo the PwC partner in charge of the audit, 
there were accounting issues associated with year end adjustments and the 
treatment of bonuses and stock options, but the main issue was level of 
unauthorised and undisclosed borrowing.  Here it is not clear how well informed 
the Tyco compensation committee was as to the scale of the borrowing – the 
greater part of which purported to be for the purpose of assisting senior 
employees to pay tax due on stock option awards - but the SEC enforcement 
release notes that Frank Walsh who served as the Chairman of the Board's 
Compensation Committee from 1998 through 2000 and as a member of the 
Board's Corporate Governance Committee and Lead Director in 2001 received, in 
2001, an undisclosed $20 million finder's fee in connection with the acquisition of 
The CIT Group, Inc., comprising a $10 million payment directly to Walsh and a 
$10 million contribution by Tyco to a charitable foundation chosen by Walsh. 
 
A significant aspect of the SEC’s case against Scalzo and PwC was the failure of 
the external auditors to identify at an early stage the fact that the loans supposedly 
to assist the payment of tax on stock options were in fact being utilised for a 
variety of other purposes, despite the fact that at an early stage they, the auditors, 
were provided with evidence strongly suggestive of this.  The enforcement release 
describes entries in working papers available to the auditors as follows: 
 
“Most of the 1997 line items for the Kozlowski account also include a brief 
description for each such item, and eighteen carry descriptions that are 
immediately recognizable as not being for the payment of taxes on the 
vesting of restricted stock.  For example, one item reads "WINE CELLAR," 
another reads "NEW ENG WINE," another "BMW REG/TAX," another 
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"ANGIE KOZLOWS," and thirteen read either "WALDORF," "WALDORF 
RENT," "WALDORF EXPEN," "WALDORF RENT A," or  “WALDORF 
RENT S.”” 
 
Notwithstanding an awareness of the extensive nature of the loans to management 
and a whole range of issues relating to accounting treatment and disclosure which 
raised serious questions as to the integrity of senior management PwC continued 
to conduct their audit as if these concerns were not present.  As the relevant 
enforcement release notes: 
 
“In contrast to the requirements of GAAS, Scalzo conducted the financial 
statement audits for Tyco's fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, under 
an assessment of risk that remained unchanged by facts and events that 
called into question the character and integrity of Tyco's most senior 
management.  With regard to those facts and events, "the evidence obtained" 
did not cause him "to modify the nature, timing, and extent of other planned 
procedures." AU § 316.33.  When it came to Tyco's most senior management, 
Scalzo did not reevaluate risk assessment as a result of conditions that arose 
during the course of fieldwork or as a result of audit test results.  See 
AU § 316.25, .33.” 
 
Apart from highlighting weaknesses in the audit approach, the Tyco case also 
illustrates external audit failings in bringing audit findings to the attention of the 
audit committee.  The enforcement release separately refers to Scalzo’s failure to 
inform the audit committee of his knowledge (as it was acquired over time) that 
loans designated to pay the tax on vesting stock had been used to exercise tens of 
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millions of dollars of stock options; his knowledge of the existence of tens of 
millions of dollars of non-interest bearing loans made to senior executives or that 
Tyco’s management had repeatedly rejected PwC’s recommendation that these 
loans should be disclosed; his knowledge of the existence of ‘last minute post-
period adjustments’ designed to offset expenses improperly against general 
reserves; and his knowledge that Tyco had provided false information about 
Walsh’s finder’s fee.   
 
Xerox  
Xerox is a company incorporated in New York which manufactures, sells and 
leases document imaging products, services and supplies in the United States and 
130 other countries. In the year 2000, Xerox employed approximately 92,500 
people worldwide, 50,000 of them in the United States. Its accounting practices in 
the years immediately preceding and including the year 2000 were the subject of 
extensive investigation by the SEC as reflected in the following extract from the 
SEC complaint against its auditors KPMG.:
v
 
 
“From at least 1997 through publication of the company's 2000 
financial report, Xerox abandoned its obligation to accurately report 
its financial condition. Xerox did so by using undisclosed manipulative 
accounting devices at the end of each financial reporting period which 
distorted the true picture of its business performance, always with the 
result that Xerox reported greater pre-tax earnings than would have 
been reported absent these devices. These devices defeated the 
bedrock purpose of the accounting rules and public disclosure — to 
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fairly, accurately and timely inform the public of the actual financial 
performance of the company.  When Xerox finally restated its financial 
results for 1997-2000, it restated $6.1 billion in equipment revenues 
and $1.9 billion in pre-tax earnings — the largest restatement in U.S. 
history to that time.” 
 
The effect of the various accounting manipulations on the level of earnings in the 
various quarters from 1997 to 1999 can be gauged from the following table 
extracted from the SEC litigation release 
 
 
Xerox employed a range of accounting devices to enable to manipulate its 
earnings numbers. Some were relatively straightforward (for example the creation 
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of unnecessary reserves on acquisition which could subsequently be released to 
the income statement) others, relating to the valuation of the equipment leased by 
Xerox, were a little more complicated, but had the purpose of reducing the 
amount of the lease payments which could be characterised as interest or 
financing income in future years and increasing the amount of earnings which 
could be recognised immediately on completion of the lease agreement. In respect 
to corporate governance it was the auditors KPMG that drew the brunt of the 
SEC’s wrath in its litigation complaint. The SEC characterised the actions of the 
defendant KPMG partners in the following terms: 
 
“Although the defendants occasionally voiced concern to Xerox 
management about the "topside accounting devices" developed and 
manipulated by senior corporate financial managers to increase 
revenue and earnings, the defendants did little or nothing when Xerox 
ignored their concerns and continued manipulating its financial 
results. The defendants then knowingly or recklessly set aside their 
reservations, failed in their professional duties as auditors, and gave a 
clean bill of health to Xerox's financial statements.” 
 
Neither the Xerox audit committee or the internal audit function appear as other 
than bit players in the separate SEC complaints against the Xerox senior 
management and the auditors, although there is passing reference to the extent to 
which KPMG communicated its concerns to the audit committee as the following 
extracts from the SEC’s complaint illustrate: 
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“Finally, Safran [the engagement partner who was ultimately removed 
from the audit at the request of Xerox] told Conway and Boyle [other 
involved KPMG partners] that KPMG had a "professional obligation" 
under GAAS to communicate his concerns to the Xerox Audit 
Committee. However, Conway, Safran and Boyle did not raise any 
such issues at the next Audit Committee meeting, and Safran 
ultimately signed off on the 1999 financial statements with Conway's 
and Boyle's knowledge and concurrence.” 
 
In a report to the audit committee, also in early 2000, Safran stated: 
 
 “we believe the Company needs to improve its analytic processes and 
controls to confirm that the assumptions used are reasonable and that 
appropriate fair values are derived from existing methodologies.” 
 
But he did not follow this through further and in October 2000,  
 
“[H]e sent the Xerox Audit Committee an analysis of Xerox's revenue 
allocation methods which did not mention the skepticism of KPMG 
auditors in Europe and accepted without question management 
representations that the margin normalization device was 
appropriate.” 
 
In this respect the SEC concluded: 
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“The defendants expressed muted doubts about topside accounting 
practices to Xerox management and to the Xerox Audit Committee in 
year-end letters and reports But the KPMG defendants did not comply 
with their professional obligation under GAAS or the securities laws 
to require Xerox to change its financial reporting, or, if Xerox declined 
to do so, to qualify KPMG audit reports, issue no report at all, resign 
from the audit and, if necessary, notify the Commission that it had 
resigned because Xerox's financial reporting materially 
misrepresented the financial condition and operations of the 
company.” 
 
 
Hollinger 
Conrad Black built up, from the 1960s onwards, a newspaper and publishing 
empire initially in Canada alone, but latterly expanding to include significant titles 
in the US, the UK, and Israel.  As the business interests expanded, a corporate 
structure evolved marked both by quite high levels of debt and perhaps more 
importantly by a pyramid arrangement together with shares with different voting 
rights whereby Conrad Black supported by some key associates and by virtue of a 
majority stake in Ravelston, the company at the head of the pyramid, was able to 
retain all but complete control of the business entities (the appendix illustrates the 
group structure).  Following significant losses in 2002 (and 2003) and allegations 
of impropriety by a significant minority shareholder, Tweedy Browne (an 
investment and broking company), in June 2003 a special internal committee, 
advised by a former SEC chairman, was set up by Hollinger primarily to 
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investigate the allegations of impropriety and breach of fiduciary duty.  This 
committee made its investigations against a background of keen SEC interest and 
court actions relating to a bitter dispute over the sale of the UK titles which saw 
Black and his associates forced out of the company.  The Breeden Report filed 
with the SEC and published in August 2004 is uncompromising in its support for 
these allegations.  It states on its opening page:  
 
“[T]his story is about how Hollinger was systematically manipulated and 
used by its controlling shareholders for their sole benefit, and in a manner 
that violated every concept of fiduciary duty.  Not once or twice, but on 
dozens of occasions Hollinger was victimized by its controlling shareholders 
as they transferred to themselves and their affiliates more than $400 million 
in the last seven years.  The aggregate cash taken by Hollinger’s former 
CEO Conrad M.  Black and its former COO.  David Radler and their 
associates represented 95.2% of Hollinger’s entire adjusted net income 
during 1997-2003.” 
 
The mechanisms by which it is alleged the controlling shareholders benefited 
themselves at the expense of the other shareholders were many and varied.  They 
included: 
 
 Excessive ‘management fees’ paid to Ravelston the company at the top of 
the pyramid owned by Black and associatesvi 
 Payments for the agreement of Black and associates not to compete with 
other parties subsequent to the sale of particular titlesvii 
 The sale of  assets to Black and associates at less than their market valueviii 
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 A reduction in the price of assets sold by Hollinger for the purpose of 
enabling Black and associates to receive subsequent management fees 
from the purchasersix 
 
Although these make up the greater part of the estimated improper enrichment of 
$400m the Report documents relentlessly a continuous tale of what it terms 
‘corporate kleptocracy’ including the more headline grabbing use of company 
assets for personal perquisites for Black and his wife, an incentivisation scheme 
on a portfolio of hi-tech investments which paid Black and associates $5.3m 
notwithstanding overall portfolio losses of $67.8m and much else besides. 
 
As set out in its proxy filings (Form D14) the governance structure of Hollinger 
over the relevant time period comprised a Board of Directors (executive and non-
executive), an Executive Committee, an Audit Committee, a Compensation 
Committee and a Stock Option Committee.  There was no separate Nominating 
Committee.  Throughout the period from early 1998 through to 2002 the 
composition of all of these Committees was unchanged.  The Audit Committee 
comprised three non-executive directors, Richard Burt, a director since 1994, 
former US ambassador to West Germany, chief negotiator in strategic arms 
reduction talks from 1989 to 1991 and subsequently a partner in McKinsey; Marie 
– Josee Kravis, a director since 1996 and a senior fellow of the Hudson Institute 
since 1994; and, the Chairman, James Thompson, a director since 1994, governor 
of the state of Illinois from 1977 to 1991.  The Compensation Committee had just 
two members (Burt and Thompson) as did the Stock Option Committee.  
Thompson chaired both of these Committees as well.  Both the Audit Committee 
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and the Compensation Committee had established charters detailing their 
composition and responsibilities and the specific responsibilities of the audit 
committee were set out annually in the proxy filing 14A made to the SEC.  This 
filing made clear the responsibility of the Audit Committee for reviewing both the 
level of management fees charged by the holding company and other related party 
transactions, it stated: 
 
“In addition, pursuant to the Services Agreements, the Audit Committee is 
responsible for reviewing the cost of services charged by Ravelston… The 
Audit Committee also has authority to recommend to the Board policies and 
procedures for dealing with conflicts of interest and to review the application 
of such policies and procedures.”x 
 
However, in the outcome the exercise of this responsibility left much to be desired 
and, although acknowledging that on many occasions the Audit Committee 
received inappropriate and misleading information from the executive directors, 
the Report is relentlessly critical of the performance of the Audit Committee.  For 
example in respect to the management fees charged: 
 
“The Audit Committee never asked for (or seemed to think it worth knowing) 
any information about Ravelston’s overall costs, revenues or profits.  They 
did not ask for a breakdown of indirect costs Ravelston was proposing to 
charge to Hollinger, such as taxes, pensions, occupancy, IT and security, or 
take any steps to verify that Hollinger’s fees were supporting only services 
for Hollinger…More fundamentally, the Audit Committee didn’t appear to 
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understand exactly what services Ravelston actually provided for Hollinger, 
or what the cost or value of those services might be.”xi 
 
Further: 
 
“Given the magnitude of the management fee requests, it is incomprehensible that the 
Audit Committee never demanded that Ravelston provide any supporting data to justify 
them.”xii 
 
and the approval of the various non-compete arrangements, in particular those 
relating to the CanWest purchase: 
 
“Despite the serious misrepresentations [made by one of the executive 
directors], the Audit Committee approved $51.8 million in payments to Black 
and his Ravelston associates in a September 11, 2000 meeting that lasted 
only 55 minutes.  They did not seek any advice from any financial or legal 
experts independent of Black and Ravelston about the appropriateness or 
amounts of the payments.  The Audit Committee didn’t…ask the obvious 
question of why Black, Radler and the other individuals were entitled to 
receive payments for doing something they were already obligated to do by 
virtue of their status as Hollinger officers (since Hollinger had also signed a 
non-compete agreement with CanWest).”xiii 
 
and in circumstances where the audit committee was in possession of full 
information but failed to act in a meaningful way.  For example in respect to the 
incentivisation plan: 
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“The Audit Committee displayed a similarly detached approach in reviewing 
many of the other related-party transactions covered in this Report.  For 
example, they approved the Digital Incentive Plan without obtaining 
independent legal or financial advice concerning the structure of the plan or 
whether its terms were, as Radler had represented, consistent with industry 
practice.  The Committee did not question why: (i) there was no offset for 
losing investments; (ii) the plan was to be administered by Black, Radler and 
Colson, who had direct financial interests in the outcome of their decisions; 
(iii) the “amount realized” on investments was to be calculated as of the date 
the investments’ underlying securities became marketable (instead of when 
Digital received the proceeds); or (iv) why Hollinger management deserved 
additional incentive payments or compensation to manage Digital’s 
investments when they were already being generously (and, as the Special 
Committee has found, excessively) compensated through the management 
services agreement.”xiv 
 
In attempting to determine why, if the conclusions of the special report are 
accepted, the audit committee failed so spectacularly, aspects of interest include 
those relating to the expertise of the audit committee, the nature of their 
appointment and potential fee dependence, and their personal and social 
relationships with executive management.   
 
In terms of expertise two of the committee members, Burt and Thompson, had 
extensive political experience and Kravis had been a high profile 
economist/journalist.  Thompson was a trained lawyer and Kravis had worked as 
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a financial analyst in the early years of her career - but it is open to question 
whether they satisfied the Audit Committee Charter requirements that each of the 
members of the committee should be financially literate and that ‘at least one 
member of the Audit Committee shall have accounting or related financial 
management expertise’.  However, where in some cases the complexity of certain 
of the transactions and the nature of the financial instruments employed 
obfuscated the more basic lack of integrity of senior management, it is difficult to 
say that this was the case at Hollinger. It is perhaps a little ironic that Burt, a 
leading player in cold war negotiations as to disarmament, was not able to put that 
experience to good use in such a situation but in fact the negotiations, such as they 
were, lay between Radler (Black’s executive associate) and Thompson and were 
described by the Report as: 
 
“Radler, wearing his Ravelston shareholder hat, submitting an annual 
management fee proposal — in most years, simply the dollar amount that 
Ravelston wanted to be paid — to Thompson, as Chairman of the Audit 
Committee.  After a cursory discussion, Thompson would agree to the 
proposal.”   
 
Of course the audit committee members were dependent upon executive 
management for their information as to the transactions that they were required to 
approve, and in circumstances where executive management had a compelling 
incentive to mislead the audit committee, and appears to have done so on a 
number of occasions, this lack of an independent knowledge base greatly 
restricted the effectiveness of the committee.  This reliance upon executive 
management for information and a reluctance to seek alternative sources of 
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information or to use their powers to commission independent advice is referred 
to throughout the Report:  
 
“In performing our work, the Special Committee discovered a pattern of 
misleading statements to the Board and the Audit Committee surrounding 
related-party transactions.  In addition to making false statements, we also 
found many cases in which Black, Radler, Kipnis or others failed to tell the 
Board or the Audit Committee key facts necessary to fully understand 
transactions or payments as to which partial information was given.  “Lying 
by omission” can be just as misleading as making a false statement, and 
unfortunately both occurred in connection with Hollinger’s Board” 
 
However it continues: 
 
“These reasons do not seem enough, however, to justify the Audit 
Committee’s passivity and its acquiescence to everything Black proposed.” 
 
And in this context it is necessary to consider the independence of the non-
executive directors and their financial and other links with Black and his 
associates. The financial remuneration of the non-executive directors was not 
negligible, in 2000 each director was entitled to an annual directors fee of $32,500 
and a fee of $3,000 for each board or committee meeting attended.  In 2000 the 
full board met on six occasions, the audit committee met on three occasions and 
the compensation committee met twice.  In addition to this there was a modest, 
but again not negligible, annual stock option entitlement for non-executive 
directors which appears to have taken up fully or nearly so by all those entitled. 
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Some publicity has been given to the links between the charitable donations of 
Hollinger made to bodies associated with the executive and non-executive 
directors.  This aspect is covered in some detail in the Report although it appears 
that only in the case of Kravis were donations made to bodies where a personal 
interest was identified.  It is also true that the members of the audit committee did 
not obtain personal pecuniary benefit from any of the irregularities, other than 
their declared remuneration.xv 
 
Reflections and Insights 
Insights gathered from the review of the above cases may be indicative that 
neither individually nor collectively can the component parts of the present 
paradigm of ‘good’ corporate governance be taken to provide that level of 
reassurance and protection for investors and other corporate stakeholders which 
the regulators on both sides of the Atlantic and further afield believe them to be 
capable of.  Whereas the activity and practice of external audit has come under, to 
a greater or lesser extent, searching examination over the last twenty years, there 
has been a lesser critical focus on the role and practice of audit committees and 
hardly any on that of internal audit.  In this respect the evidence presented above 
may be interpreted as reinforcing the view that there are commonalities in the 
forces that shape the activities and function of these separate governance activities 
which are likely to seriously weaken their ability to fulfil the role ascribed to them 
by regulators and others.  These are to an extent overlapping and interrelated but 
for discussion purposes may be categorised in terms of: fee dependence, lack of 
both expertise and the possession of an independent knowledge base, and social 
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and psychological dependence.  To take each in turn: 
 
Fee dependence 
Non-executive directors, external auditors, and internal auditors are remunerated 
by the company.  If they consider that this stream of remuneration is likely to 
cease consequent upon their behaviour then that behaviour may, and indeed is 
likely to be, modified accordingly.  Fee dependence issues relating to external 
auditors have been extensively aired over many years with particular concerns 
being raised both as to dependence at individual and office level – the loss of a 
major client will almost inevitably adversely affect an individual’s remuneration 
and standing within the audit firm – and as to the enhanced dependence caused by 
the associated provision of non-audit services to audit clients.  Notwithstanding 
the regulatory attempts to mitigate fee dependence issues, for example in terms of 
strengthening the powers of audit committees with respect to determining auditor 
remuneration and in prohibition of audit partner remuneration being linked to the 
sale of non-audit services, arguably fee dependence contributed to external audit 
failure in a number of the above cases, perhaps most notably at Xerox where the 
SEC noted that: 
 
“Each of the KPMG defendants was aware that Xerox was a star client of the 
firm. KPMG had been Xerox's auditor for 40 years and had generated over 
$56 million in non-audit fees during 1997-2000, as well as $26 million in 
audit fees. No KPMG defendant wanted to risk antagonizing the client or 
resigning the engagement.”
 xvi
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The levels of the remuneration of non-executive directors varied in the cases 
under consideration – with the $20m finder’s fee received by the Lead Director of 
the Tyco Corporate Governance Committee a significant outlier.  However even at 
the more modest levels of remuneration exhibited elsewhere the amounts are far 
from negligible either in terms of an individual income or in relation to the 
number of hours worked.  It would require a major reappraisal of conventional 
beliefs and theories about human nature to believe the amounts involved would 
not be relevant to the individuals concerned – the more so if patronage over 
corporate charitable giving was perceived to be part of the compensation package.  
Again the nomination committee is seen as an intervening factor between 
executive management and the appointment of non-executive directors, and it 
may well be significant that Hollinger had no nomination committee – but the 
appointments to the nominating committee and the overlap between the various 
committees may call into doubt how effective this has been in the past or will be 
in the future. 
 
Internal audit has historically been entirely dependent upon executive 
management for resources and powers and as employees internal auditors were in 
a position with little more protection than other employees if they wished to 
challenge senior management (Gramling et al., 2004).  Again it is by ensuring that 
internal auditors report directly to the audit committee and by requiring an audit 
committee role in approval of the work programme of the internal audit function 
that it has been sought to mitigate the threat to internal auditor independence. 
 
Knowledge and Expertise 
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Audit committees, external auditors and internal auditors each have to possess 
competence, knowledge and the power to investigate matters of concern if they 
are to fulfil their duties appropriately.  Wolnizer (1987) and Power (1997) have 
both identified the critical need for auditors to have a knowledge base, whether 
pre-existing or as a result of search and evidential inquiry, which enables them to 
form an independent opinion as to the quality of financial reporting.  In the 
absence of such knowledge, an audit is likely to degenerate into no more than an 
acceptance of management representation and be of correspondingly little value.  
Indeed some would argue that as business activity becomes ever more complex as 
a consequence of globalisation and expansion of markets for services and 
products, then it is the provision of non-audit services which both adds value to 
the client and provides the auditor with the essential understanding of the mode 
and nature of the client’s activities, an understanding which will underpin the 
audit opinion.   
 
In the cases outlined above the extent of the knowledge of the parties differed in 
each case.  Arguably in none of the cases did any of the parties have the full 
knowledge of the facts as revealed by subsequent events and ex post investigation, 
but there is little doubt that in respect to Xerox the external auditors were aware 
of the nature of the questionable accounting practices being followed but accepted 
them as appropriate.  In Tyco the auditor was clearly aware of factors indicative 
of impropriety but appears to have limited the extent and depth of further 
investigation which would have revealed the full scale of these improprieties.  In 
Hollinger, as documented by the Breeden report, KPMG appear to have played a 
role which was neither central nor peripheral.  They were auditors for all the main 
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companies in the pyramid and cannot have been unaware of the level of 
management fees charged or the relationship, if any, between these fees and costs 
incurred - but they appear to have raised little if any concern.  The report notes 
that neither KPMG nor Torys (Hollinger’s legal advisers) alerted the audit 
committee to any concerns as to either the level of management fees or the 
propriety of the non-compete payments.  
 
In WorldCom it is not clear whether Andersen was aware of the significant level 
of ‘corporate accruals’ – although perhaps they should have been.  Although 
external auditors have both the capability, and the statutory power to investigate 
matters to the full and, subject to control over work programme and resources, 
internal auditors too are well placed to investigate irregularity and accounting 
manipulation, this is not so with respect to audit committees and non-executive 
directors more generally.  A number of the cases, for example Hollinger and 
Xerox document a lack of understanding by audit committee members of the 
issues at stake, a lack of understanding exacerbated by an inadequately sceptical 
approach, control of information flows (including internal audit reports) to the 
audit committee by executive management, and a striking reluctance by external 
auditors to articulate their concerns to audit committees. 
 
The board’s expertise may not always extend to that of the accountants involved 
in external audits, but they have a duty to be sceptical and to ask questions if they 
do not understand a transaction.  In the surveyed cases, they apparently did not do 
this.  Still, insufficient knowledge and expertise may not always be at the heart of 
the issue.  In the case of Hollinger, no deep accounting knowledge, per se, was 
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required, just a degree of common sense and a sense of scepticism before signing 
away shareholders’ money.  It is one thing to argue incompetence in view of 
complicated (or obscure) accounting or legal details, or ignorance of facts and 
accounting procedures, but it is another to, effectively, sign blank cheques, as at 
Hollinger. 
 
 
Social and Psychological Dependence 
Whereas issues of fee dependence have been extensively discussed, at least in 
respect to external audits, wider, largely non-economic, relationships in terms of 
familiarity, bonding, and socialisation have been accorded much less prominence 
although arguably they may play at least as an important part in determining the 
relationship between executive management and non-executive directors/external 
audit/internal audit.  They have received some attention in respect to external 
audit and issues as to the interlocking nature of directorships have also been 
explored extensively in the economics and corporate governance literature. 
Another line of inquiry investigates the effects of heuristics and bias, and group 
decision making on the quality of judgement and choice making of agents within 
corporate governance.
xvii
 
 
Details emerging from investigations of the cases outlined above indicate that 
auditors may have known, and certainly were in a position to know, that particular 
accounting treatments were highly questionable.  These gatekeepers (Coffee, 
2001, 2003) would appear to have lowered their guard – or perhaps even looked 
the other way when warning signs were clearly visible.  This view is not 
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uniformly shared, Morrison (2004) for example argues that Arthur Andersen was 
made a scapegoat by US federal authorities for its involvement with Enron.   
However, the string of poor quality audits in which the firm had previously been 
involved (as evidenced by ex post SEC investigation) does not support a positive 
interpretation of the quality of internal control within the firm (Turner, 2005). 
Indeed, auditing practice has at times been characterised as an exercise in 
“marshalling evidence to justify or defend a choice that is preferred by the 
auditee” (Prentice 2000a, p.1610), an assessment echoed by the UK’s 
Competition Commission’s (CC 2013a, p.11).  Furthermore, in recent years all of 
the large auditing firms have been associated with issues of audit quality at major 
clients which might be seen as an indication of generic problems which cannot be 
attributed just to the failings of individual partners or firms. 
 
While, as noted by Clarke et al. (2003), the flexibility provided by accounting 
standards and the nature of accruals accounting, which some would see as 
representative of systemic defects in the understanding and practice of financial 
reporting indubitably make the task of auditors and other parties with governance 
responsibilities we think that it is incontrovertible that the failings identified in the 
cases we have considered go far beyond those which can be wholly attributed to 
the imprecise nature of financial reporting in an uncertain world. Rather they raise 
more fundamental questions as to why gatekeepers so frequently either fail to be 
aware of, or even acquiesce in, improper behaviour and practices of executive 
management. 
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Whether audit deficiencies and audit failures are seen as having been caused by 
an insufficient application of professional scepticism (PCAOB, 2008, 2011a,b, 
2012, 2015; Centre for Audit Quality 2010; House of Lords, HoL, 2011; Messier, 
Prawitt, and Glower, 2012; Glower and Prawitt, 2014), or were due to 
insufficiencies in the application of professional skill or competence (IES 8, 
IAESB, 2008), behavioural and situational factors have a critical impact on the 
consistent and adequate application of either of these ingredients to audit quality.  
Here we would argue that the standard corporate governance template - based on 
the rational choice model of traditional economics - fails to take sufficient account 
of the psychological and social pressures on monitors and gatekeepers, and their 
use of heuristics in judgement formation. 
 
As such, insights from a variety of studies on judgement in audit and elsewhere, 
would appear to indicate that independence in mind is an ideal more honored in 
the breach than in practice (Gwilliam et al. 2014).  In summary, issues of conflict 
of interest and bias, indicate that proposals for reforms of corporate governance 
along traditional lines (closing loopholes, more regulation, higher fines, etc.) may 
impose additional costs without commensurate benefit in terms of improved 
financial reporting and managerial behaviour. 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this paper – based on study of four major corporate 
cause celebres – provides at best muted support for the viewpoint that seeking to 
reinforce the existing corporate governance structure along the lines advocated in 
both North America and the UK will necessarily act to prevent any such future 
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failure of corporate governance.  If anything the evidence is indicative of an 
extended layer of regulation which, unless there is further consideration of the 
appropriate institutional structure within which ‘good’ corporate governance can 
take place, is likely to be both costly and ineffective.  The increase in costs is 
already with us in terms of increased expenditure on internal audit and burgeoning 
fees for audit firms (primarily linked to advice on internal control) and non-
executive directors.  Measurement of the actual or potential benefits in terms of 
improved information to the capital markets and a check on management excess 
and profligacy is of course much less easy to achieve – however the cases 
reviewed above suggest that to accept uncritically the received and paradigmatic 
wisdom as to what constitutes ‘better’ corporate governance without further 
consideration of the interaction between relevant economic, institutional, 
behavioural and case specific forces might be unwise. 
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